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Introduction to the 2009 Editors’
Symposium: Isaiah Berlin, Value
Pluralism, and the Law

LARRY ALEXANDER*

The outstanding collection of articles and comments thereon that
follows this Introduction constitutes the 2009 Editors’ Symposium of the
San Diego Law Review. The Editors’ Symposium, an annual event, began
with the 2004 Symposium, What Is Legal Interpretation?, which appeared
in these pages in Volume 42.1 It was followed in 2005 by the Symposium,
The Meaning of Marriage;2 in 2006 by the Symposium, The Rights and
Wrongs of Discrimination;3 in 2007 by the Symposium, Informational
Privacy: Philosophical Foundations and Legal Implications;4 and in
2008 by the Symposium, National Borders and Immigration.5 All six
symposia were organized by the Institute for Law and Philosophy at the
University of San Diego School of Law, and all consisted of papers and
comments presented at the School of Law. The 2010 Editors’ Symposium,
Freedom of Conscience: Stranger in a Secular Land, will take place in
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April 2010, with subsequent publication of its papers in Volume 47 of
the Law Review.
It is a widely held view that value pluralism and liberalism—both as a
political morality and as a set of legal institutions—go hand in glove.
Modern liberalism largely owes its genesis to a very basic form of value
pluralism, namely, that of multiple religions and the religious wars that
were its product.
The twentieth-century British philosopher Isaiah Berlin was a
defender of the proposition that basic values are plural, and thus that
there are ultimate goods that can only be obtained by sacrificing other
ultimate goods. For example, liberty cannot be reduced to equality,
contra Ronald Dworkin,6 nor can equality be reduced to liberty, contra
Robert Nozick.7 Berlin was also an opponent of the politics of monistic
values, seeing in them the seeds of tyrannical totalitarianism.
But is Berlin right? Are there really plural ultimate values? And if he
is, what, if anything, does this entail for our laws and legal institutions?
If values are plural, is there anything wrong about a society’s favoring
one at the expense of the others? Or must space be left for the others to
be pursued?
These are the questions our distinguished group of authors tackle in
the pages that follow. As you will see, they disagree about Berlin’s
basic thesis and about its implications for law. But their back-and-forths
should edify and inspire everyone who seeks to understand the basic
presuppositions of liberal societies such as ours. We are honored by
their contributions to the San Diego Law Review.
In seeking to make an annual Editors’ Symposium a reality, the
Institute and the Law Review have worked to build a permanent
endowment sufficient to finance it. To that end, we have solicited—and
shall continue to solicit—donations from all former editors of the Law
Review. Those who have contributed to date are listed at the beginning
of the issue. We are very, very grateful for your generosity and hope
this product vindicates our seeking your support. Thank you.

6. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
EQUALITY (2000).
7. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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